The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Cost Behavior




【主题】:The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Cost Behavior





【主持】: 冯旭南教授    上海财经大学投资系系主任

【摘要】:We examine the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms’ selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs. After the hedge fund intervention, the SG&A to sales ratio goes down, a sign of improved operating efficiency. Before the intervention, target firms exhibit greater level of cost stickiness which means SG&A costs fall less for sales decreases than they rise for equivalent sales increases, a symptom of agency problems according to Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012). However, hedge fund intervention significantly reduces the degree of cost stickiness, and the reduction is more pronounced in firms with severe agency problems. Moreover, activist hedge funds concentrate their intervention efforts on firms whose SG&A expenditures create low firm values. Finally, a tactic employed by hedge funds to change corporate cost behavior is to replace senior corporate executives. Taken as a whole, the findings suggest hedge fund activism improves the efficiency of resource adjustments by mitigating agency problems at the target firms.

【主讲人介绍】安恒(An  Heng)博士是北卡罗来纳大学(University of North Carolina)布莱恩商业和经济学院(Bryan School of Business and Economics)的副教授。他主要从事经济学和金融学的实证研究工作,并在国际知名的学术期刊发表论文10多篇,包括Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Journal of Real Estate Research,  Real Estate Economics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Review of Accounting Studies等。